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In their (in)famous work, “The Extended Mind” (1998), Andy Clark and David 
Chalmers introduce the Extended Mind Hypothesis (henceforth, EMT) by 
means of a famous example: Otto and his notebook61. This notebook ought to 
be considered as an extension of Otto’s mind, they claim, as he uses it as 
a functional equivalent of certain cognitive capacities that are normally 
lodged inside the head. Clark and Chalmers have to do the hard work of laying 
the groundwork for getting cognition out of the head. However, EMT is miss-
ing something that Clark and Chalmers find pernicious. In fact, if this review 
were a proper space for joking, I would say that Clark and Chalmers do not 
want to include into their theory what many men do not like to even talk 
about: their feelings. That is, they seek to avoid the “qualia trap,” by which 
they mean the question of how we feel about our experiences (qualia). In his 
recent book Feeling Extended: Sociality as Extended Body-Becoming-Mind, 
Douglas Robinson introduces “feeling” back into the extended mind in a com-
pelling and effective way. Currently Chair Professor of English and Dean of 
the Arts Faculty at Hong Kong Baptist University, Robinson’s varied research 
interests and publications are all found by the common thread of inter- (and 
perhaps intra-) communication. Robinson is in the difficult position of strad-
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dling two worlds: Materialism and Idealism. He writes of himself in the Intro-
duction to Feeling Extended…, that he is “a materialist who recognizes that 
everything we know about material reality is a quale, and an idealist who 
recognizes that qualia are human groups’ ultimately inadequate attempts to 
represent and control material reality” (15).  
As a general note, the author’s style is florid and convivial. This book is truly 
a pleasure to read (or at least feels that way). The author’s personal accounts 
are a pleasant surprise—his novel method of counting laps while swimming, 
a fight with his (now ex-) wife in Note 12 of Chapter One that leads to a broken 
fender and a psychically wounded arm, his feeling at home with the Spanish 
language despite his lack of ability to communicate in it. He is able to paint 
a picture so vivid that the reader too must find herself victim to the conative 
force of his writing. Included in this text is a delightful Appendix called “Liar-
Paradox Monism.” This Appendix should be read as soon as possible upon 
picking up the text. In it Robinson addresses Chalmers’ Hard Problem of Con-
sciousness (“the problem not only of how but of why certain physical struc-
tures give rise to consciousness (or experience, or qualia)” (Robinson 179)). 
That is, we cannot get at an understanding of qualia from the standpoint of 
the “real,” physical world. The two options we are left with to make sense of 
qualia, on Robinson’s account, are “a naturalistic or interactive dualism that 
posits two realms, the physical and the mental, and builds bridges between 
them, and a panpsychic monism that explains the physical as proto-
experiential” (179). Robinson’s answer to the Problem is to lie—a philosophi-
cal position that he has playfully termed “Liar-Paradox monism (LP monism).” 
By giving an analysis of Oscar Wilde’s “The Decay of Lying,” Robinson offers 
a way out of the problem by postulating the possibility of maintaining a posi-
tion while acknowledging that one may be lying to oneself or others about the 
veracity of said position. That is, “what LP monism does … is embrace the dis-
sonances, embrace the complex phenomenally and rhetoricity of our engage-
ment with the world, and so offer a truer account of the world as we experi-
ence it” (203). If one were to make sense of this Appendix one would make 
sense of the overall force of the text. We cannot give a “real” account of the 
world—we are always-already in a situation that is determined by myriad 
factors beyond our capacity to fully understand, though it is possible that we 
might tell ourselves some sort of sense-making narrative based upon our ex-
periences. But, “I could be lying to myself” (206). Robinson gives a clearer ex-
ample of what he means by the liar-paradox in Chapter One: “my computer, 
who is my friend, sometimes unaccountably acts like an inanimate object. As 
a result, I form a belief that it probably is an inanimate object, and keep pro-
visionally contrasting that belief with my strong feeling that it is alive and 
friendly and there to help me do my work till I am willing to say, tentatively, 
that probably only seems to be alive" (66). That is, my interaction with my 
computer is as-if it were really alive and not merely a mechanical extension of 




myself. While I know “intellectually” that I am the one who set up applications 
on my computer that make writing easier and also that I am the one who in-
teracts with the interface meaningfully, when my computer breaks down I am 
forced to see the lie I’ve been telling myself. 
In Chapter One of his book, Robinson gives an account of the central concepts 
of the EMT. He undergirds his argument with Hegel’s philosophy of mind re-
garding the interaction between mind and tools. While the bulk of the work 
done by proponent of within Philosophy of Mind has been to articulate and 
defend the claim that our consciousness—at least, parts of our cognitive appa-
ratus—extends into the world, outside of the brain and even outside of the 
skin, Robinson offers an “as-if” (to borrow from Damasio 1999) EMT—we feel 
our consciousness as-if it were extended. Though the chapter is titled “Inside 
Out,” Robinson suggests that a fuller title would be “Inside Out and Outside In” 
(34). In elucidating these two points I will turn to the examples Robinson uses: 
his two wives. In “Outside in,” which refers to one’s feelings towards the 
things outside of us, he gives the example of his own experience of learning 
Russian: Russian was a foreign tongue to him until he heard his second wife 
“speaking loving Russian” to their daughter (53). Once he heard the language 
in this loving context, he felt more at home with it. He writes, “If learning is 
largely an outside-in operation—the internalization of words, numbers, imag-
es, ideas to which we are exposed outside our heads—there must be a process 
by which things that are alien to us because they are outside us gradually be-
come part of our affective-becoming-conative ‘tissue’” (55). By “inside out,” 
Robinson engages with the Hegelian notion of tools and cognition as extended 
desire (or, “interactive affect-becoming-conation” (55)). There is a revealing 
section in this chapter in which he discusses “Proprioceptively extended cog-
nition,” whereby the individual throws out their mind-map, for want of a bet-
ter expression, onto the world at large. Robinson and his first wife, evidently, 
had a contentious relationship. One argument ended with their car fender 
being dented. Although he was outside the car watching the accident unfold, 
he “felt a stabbing pain in my left shoulder. My nervous system, mapping my 
body onto the car’s, lying prone with my wife “steering” me, simulated in my 
body the “pain” “felt” by the car’s body. Antonio Damasio (1999: 80) calls the 
neuronal system that makes this simulation possible the “as-if body loop,” but 
mainly means by it our bodies’ tendency to mimic the body states of other 
people. The possibility that we also simulate the “body states” of inanimate 
objects would be a materialist explanation of the pathetic fallacy” (Robinson 
2013, n.1.12, 211). The extension of one’s body to an inanimate object is intri-
guing in its obviousness. When one sees one’s car with scrapes on the side 
after a particularly terrible parking job, one winces, regardless of whether the 






In Chapter Two, “Language as Cognitive Labels” Robinson engages with Ad-
ams and Aizawa, who so dearly seek to keep cognition in the head. He offers 
“a counter model (to Fodor’s language-of-thought hypothesis and the Compu-
tational Theory of Mind) by tracing the actual emergence of thought out of 
embodied (affective-becoming-cognitive) communication with others” (28). 
Robinson seeks to problematize what he sees as the “binarization in terms of 
cognition and noncognition” of the “spectrum of thought and language” by 
appealing to “fuzzy logic” (78). That is, Robinson claims that Adams and Aiza-
wa do an injustice to the inexorably intertwined nature of thought and lan-
guage. To put it plainly, Robinson sees a difficulty with the claim that thought 
stays in the head and affects language and is not in turn affected by our own 
use of language or other transcranial forces (i.e. the language of other people). 
Following Robinson’s example in this chapter, I say something rude to my 
friend. He asks me if I am hungry and therefore “hangry” and I say “Yes.” He 
offers a cookie and things are resolved. Where did the realization occur in me 
- the realization that I was angry because I was hungry? It was only upon fur-
ther reflection due to his comment that I realized that I was indeed being ag-
gressive because my blood sugar was low and I desperately needed to eat 
something. The force of this argument in this chapter is thus: it is silly to di-
vide up this interaction into “discrete chunks labeled ‘cognition’ and ‘noncog-
nition’” because that would be like trying to separate the “white” from the 
“rice” (84). Basically, Robinson claim is that there needs to be more acceptance 
of the fact that we not only are embodied creatures who think, but also think-
ing embodied creatures who interact with and are affected by the world 
and others.  
In Chapter Three, “Language as Conative Force,” Robinson critiques the lim-
ited notion of language as merely verbal labels (what Robinson considers the 
rationalist philosophy of language) he outlines in Chapter Two. Robinson 
delves into what he calls “the focal claim” of his book: “that something con-
nects us, non semantically (non propositionally)—that sociality really is 
a form of extended body-becoming-mind” (28). This connection can be seen in 
the simple fact that there is much more to communication than simple words. 
The meaning of a simple sentence is closely bound with the performance of 
that utterance. Anyone that has inadvertently started a fight with a loved one 
through text message knows the importance of tone and body language all to 
well. And how are we to describe this connection between speakers that 
makes them able to understand each other’s meanings? Throughout this text 
Robinson brings key figures in the history of philosophy, religion, and litera-
ture into conversation with more “scientific” theories of cognition and com-
munication in order to better develop his project. In this chapter, he develops 
his theory of conative force by engaging with Jacques Derrida’s iterability, Mi-
khail Bakhtin’s internal dialogism, and Pierre Bourdieu’s habitus. In doing so, 
Robinson is better able to engage with “the possibility that there are other 




channels of communication, especially some sort of affective-becoming-
conative force that is often directly verbalized as speech acts, but, as indirect 
speech acts suggest, need not be verbalized in order to be transmitted” (118).  
These forces which are passed person to person are qualia, Robinson claims in 
Chapter Four, “Qualia as Interpretants.” When I yawn I cause my friend to 
yawn; this transsomatic, transcranial activity is an interpretant that has 
a “qualia” force. As we all know, yawning is highly contagious. I am yawning 
as I write this sentence—not because I am tired, but because I am contemplat-
ing just the word itself. When I gave the example of yawning in order to de-
scribe the nature of the interrelation between qualia and interpretants with 
a colleague over the phone, she yawned as well. Transcraniality thus need not 
be local. Not surprisingly, Robinson relies on the foundational work of Charles 
Sanders Peirce to gird his views. What Robinson has to contend with is the 
seeming absurdity of qualia. Is this because men don’t like to talk about feel-
ings? Or at least take them as seriously as they do more rational things? Daniel 
Dennett certainly doesn’t, when he calls us to “‘quine’ (deny the existence of) 
qualia” (Robinson 119; see Dennett 1988). However, by denying qualia as mere 
phantasms, Dennett, Clark, et al. ignore the force that these qualia have on 
bodies-becoming-minds. When arguing with a lover, after all, it is best to use 
“subjective” language that swerves around “objective” reality. As a case in 
point, “I felt like you don’t respect my work when you ask me to watch our 
child when I’m trying to write,” is a more effective form of communication 
than “you don’t respect my work because you asked me to take care of the 
kid.” In Robinson’s words, “The notion that mind-as-qualia is somehow too 
ethereal to guide or steer the body is sheer atavistic Cartesianism” (145). 
A theory of cognition that doesn’t account for affect, or the fact that human 
beings are bodied and always surrounded by other bodied human beings, is 
unavoidably negligent and lacking. How I experience the world ought not to 
be discarded, and to do so would be to claim a strong distinction between the 
purity of mind and the muddiness of feeling, emotional bodies.  
The affective embodiment theory Robinson promotes need not be completely 
baseless and outside of contemporary research in neuroscience. In Chapter 
Five, “Empathy, Face, and Ritual,” Robinson engages with social neuroscience 
in order to further explicate his thesis. “What this empirical research strongly 
suggests,” says Robinson, “is that we don’t necessarily know what others are 
feeling, but we do tend to feel what they are feeling” (153). Once Robinson lays 
out the “empirical evidence” for bodily and mental representations as qualia, 
he turns to speculation. In an extensive section on the Ancient Greek—by way 
of Aristotle—notion of doxa, Robinson notes that “face” is a useful alternative 
translation for doxa, which my Ancient Greek lexicon enumerates as the opin-
ion which others have of one, estimation, reputation, credit, honor, glory, etc. 
Doxa is related to one’s situated identity. That is, the individual is interested in 





any means necessary. And this “face” she wishes to keep is dependent on how 
others perceive her. This account of Ancient Greek doxa is a lovely way to 
demonstrate his general theory of bodies-becoming-mind converting qualia 
into collective behavioral pressure (145). Let us unpack this: qualia is how we 
feel about things in the world. Some call this fleeting, ethereal, not “really re-
al” But how we feel about the world informs how we think and act at a deep 
level, perhaps even all the way down. We are bodies-becoming-mind, in Rob-
inson’s view, because of the complex interweaving and enmeshing of cogni-
tive and non-cognitive. Indeed things are so mixed up between body and 
mind that separating the two in order to contemplate and catalog either ends 
up in poor science. Robinson thinks that this enmeshing is also extended to 
societal interactions - as already in a social group, we convert qualia - how we 
feel about the world - into collective behavioral pressure. An example of this 
can be seen in Robinson’s discussion of the conflation of feeling and looking in 
the context of mirror neurons: “what enables us to distinguish my moment 
from yours, the individual from the group, is in fact a secondary cognitive 
(meta)quale that is belatedly imposed on transcranial proprioception.” (166). 
To Robinson, feeling caught up in an event such as the opening ceremony of 
the Beijing Olympics is not to be unconscious and unmindful, it is a distinctive 
mode of being—body-becoming-mind. Thus the “I” in the Cogito is an I that is 
after, an I that is already extended body-becoming-mind, an I that thinks it has 
stripped itself bare of everything but the essential. But to be human is not to 
be a mature mind fleshed in a body sitting comfortably by a fire, but to a be-
ing who once was an infant, who learned to talk, and, hopefully, has loved and 
been loved in return. To be human is to be already enmeshed in the world.  
Perhaps the most shocking claim of the book (even more shocking than Chap-
ter Four’s nearly ad hominem attacks against Andy Clark, which include accu-
sations of Clark inhabiting Plato’s cave) is a very innocent remark in Chapter 
One concerning our use of tools: while extending mind to tools makes Otto’s 
day easier and his capacity for cognition greater, not all tool use ends up with 
sharper users. It’s the dark secret of the EMT, on Robinson’s view, that the 
very nature of the human-tool interaction can lead to “brain-fried zombies” 
(42). That is, not all extension of mind need make one more intelligent, it may 
make one duller. This is not at all to undermine the EMT, as while Google may 
make out memory retention duller, it can arguably lead to more successful 
being-in-the-world (see also Carr 2011 and Sparrow & Wegner 2011). 
Robinson seeks to inhabit a between place between pure extension and pure 
“flesh-box.” In doing so he does not do himself any favors with potential read-
ers thoroughly entrenched in this or that camp within the Philosophy of Mind. 
Perhaps his insistence on not denying or fully ascribing to the EMT is not con-
vincing enough for either hardline externalist (e.g. Clark) or internalist (e.g. 
A&A) camps. However, doesn’t his between position relieve us of a great bur-
den: the burden of proof? If we know at base that cognition feels extended, is 




that not enough? Robert Rupert, a critic of the EMT, argues in his Cognitive 
Systems and the Extended Mind that the thinkers such as Wheeler and other 
neo-Heidegerrians are mistaken in their view that we should take into ac-
count our alreadiness, the fact that we are always-already in a culture, when 
positing accounts of the extension of mind. He claims that this phenomenolog-
ical view “suffers from an obvious and crippling foundational problem that 
the filling in of further details does not alleviate. The Heideggerian view offers 
no explanation of how the human internalizes social norms or of how social 
norms come into existence” (Rupert 2009: 162) Robinson gets around the diffi-
culty of coming up with a proper syllogism to withstand Rupert’s critique by 
rejecting the need for strong, hard science to back him up. There are plenty of 
studies he can point to in support of his claims (which he does at length in 
Chapter Five), but his appeal to fuzzy logic as well as LP monism relieves him 
of that burden of proof. 
In Feeling Extended…, Robinson misses the opportunity to bring Feminist Epis-
temology in conversation with EMT and Affect Theory. In Chapter Four, Rob-
inson really drives the stake into the heart of the primacy of science: “Empiri-
cal testing, after all, might reveal the extent to which empirical science rests 
on the gossamer foundation of qualia” (Robinson 143). He brings Thomas 
Kuhn’s work into the conversation as a way of problematizing the way in 
which “Science” is enshrined in our culture. This distrust of the “objectivity” 
which empirical science lays claim to has long been discussed in Feminist 
Epistemology. The moves Robinson makes, while interesting and important, 
are not earth-shattering when read against such figures as Donna Haraway, 
Sandra Harding, or Susan Bordo, to name but a few. That being said, it is not 
possible to engage with the entire history of philosophy in a given text, even 
for a text that engages so heavily with the literature spanning several fields, 
disciplines, and theoretical approaches. Robinson has cleared the ground—if 
you could forgive the Heideggerian phrase—for research that remains to be 
done in this area, i.e. the linking and critical interrogation of theories of Ex-
tended Mind from the perspective of Feminist Epistemology. After all, what is 
missing in classical approaches to Extended Mind? How we feel, how we in-
teract with others, basically, how “we” are in the world.  
Feeling Extended… is well-researched, well-written, and one of the more en-
joyable texts one may come across in its field. It is - on the face of it - an an-
swer to the ‘qualia trap’ that Clark and Chalmers so eagerly aim to avoid, but 
much more sophisticated than that. Douglas Robinson opens the way for new 
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